The idea of ‘stay put’ developed in the UK in the early 1960s. British Standard Code of Practice 1962 was introduced as the first national standard for tall residential buildings. It required all blocks taller than 80 feet to provide one hour’s fire resistance to enable firefighters to battle flames inside the building.
The aim of the code was to ensure that each flat in a building would act as an individual compartment that would contain any fire for at least an hour. This principle of ‘compartmentation’ would enable firefighters to put out one fire in one flat rather than face a whole building ablaze.
But to work, the principle has two key requirements. First, the building must have the necessary ‘passive fire protection’ to withstand the spread of flames. Second, access to the building must be clear enough that affected residents can escape and firefighters can get in quickly.
Partly because of this second requirement, the code considered fire alarms to be undesirable. The fear is that they could trigger unnecessary evacuations that impede firefighters’ access or even put residents in danger by exposing them to smoke.
There are many advocates for stay put, who point to data that shows it is successful in the vast majority of fires. National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) data shows that there were more than 57,000 fires in high rises between 2010 and 2017, but that only 216 (0.4%) required the evacuation of more than five residents.
Grenfell victims accuse Labour MPs of not reading the report and 'blindly supporting firefighters'
Victims of the Grenfell Tower inferno have accused the local MP of ‘blind support’ for the fire brigade in a row that threatens the Labour Party’s most vulnerable seat. Grieving families have turned on Emma Dent Coad, the Labour MP for Kensington, for refusing to condemn London Fire Brigade (LFB) over its handling of the disaster. They also accused Diane Abbott, Labour’s shadow home secretary, of not having bothered to read the official inquiry report. The Grenfell report concluded that fewer people would have died but for the “serious shortcomings” and “systemic” failures of the LFB. The LFB commissioner was also criticised for her “remarkable insensitivity” after she gave testimony insisting...
Without the benefit of hindsight, and ANY knowledge the cladding was a fire hazard, put yourself in the position of firefighters who have used the stay put policy for years. What would YOUR advice be on the tragic day?
Or even now , with hindsight , one stairway, firefighters using it, What would YOUR advice be?
The idea of ‘stay put’ developed in the UK in the early 1960s. British Standard Code of Practice 1962 was introduced as the first national standard for tall residential buildings. It required all blocks taller than 80 feet to provide one hour’s fire resistance to enable firefighters to battle flames inside the building.
The aim of the code was to ensure that each flat in a building would act as an individual compartment that would contain any fire for at least an hour. This principle of ‘compartmentation’ would enable firefighters to put out one fire in one flat rather than face a whole building ablaze.
But to work, the principle has two key requirements. First, the building must have the necessary ‘passive fire protection’ to withstand the spread of flames. Second, access to the building must be clear enough that affected residents can escape and firefighters can get in quickly.
Partly because of this second requirement, the code considered fire alarms to be undesirable. The fear is that they could trigger unnecessary evacuations that impede firefighters’ access or even put residents in danger by exposing them to smoke.
There are many advocates for stay put, who point to data that shows it is successful in the vast majority of fires. National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) data shows that there were more than 57,000 fires in high rises between 2010 and 2017, but that only 216 (0.4%) required the evacuation of more than five residents.
Grenfell victims accuse Labour MPs of not reading the report and 'blindly supporting firefighters'
Victims of the Grenfell Tower inferno have accused the local MP of ‘blind support’ for the fire brigade in a row that threatens the Labour Party’s most vulnerable seat. Grieving families have turned on Emma Dent Coad, the Labour MP for Kensington, for refusing to condemn London Fire Brigade (LFB) over its handling of the disaster. They also accused Diane Abbott, Labour’s shadow home secretary, of not having bothered to read the official inquiry report. The Grenfell report concluded that fewer people would have died but for the “serious shortcomings” and “systemic” failures of the LFB. The LFB commissioner was also criticised for her “remarkable insensitivity” after she gave testimony insisting...
Without the benefit of hindsight, and ANY knowledge the cladding was a fire hazard, put yourself in the position of firefighters who have used the stay put policy for years. What would YOUR advice be on the tragic day?
Or even now , with hindsight , one stairway, firefighters using it, What would YOUR advice be?
Grenfell Tower report: Fire service's 'stay put' advice cost lives, long awaited public inquiry concludes
Fewer people may have died in Grenfell Tower if the London Fire Brigade had not stuck so rigidly to its "stay put" policy and evacuated people instead, a public inquiry into the blaze that killed 72 people has concluded.
In a document spanning around 1,000 pages, Sir Martin Moore-Bick said there were "serious shortcomings" and "systemic" failures in its response to the fire.
But it reserves most of its criticism for the London Fire Brigade (LFB), which it says failed to educate its firefighters in the dangers associated with combustible cladding systems. It also failed to visit the block following the refurbishment to ensure the assessment of the risks it presented was accurate and up to date, the report adds.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating. The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
It says: “Once it was clear that the fire was out of control and that compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to organise the evacuation of the tower while that remained possible.
“That decision could and should have been made between 1.30am and 1.50am and would be likely to have resulted in fewer fatalities.”
But it does criticise the commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, Dany Cotton, for her evidence to the public inquiry last year, when she said she would change nothing about the LFB’s response. This was “remarkably insensitive”, it says.
Maybe if the government hadn't caused so many firefighters to lose their jobs and closed so many fire stations, they might have had the time and resources to do the necessary checks and update their procedures.
Once again, those truly responsible for covering a tower block in flammable material appear to get off scott free.
Yeah, let's just blame the firefighters and the people who died.
The de-regulation of fire safety needs to be reversed and handed back to the The deregulation of fire safety is essential in understanding how a death trap was created at Grenfell Tower, writes Matt Wrack
Why was the Grenfell Tower fire allowed to happen? This is the central question that the Grenfell Tower Inquiry must answer.
To get to the bottom of the issues, the public inquiry must address the whole fire safety regime and in particular the process of deregulation established over recent decades. Sadly, prime minister Theresa May and inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick decided that the terms of reference would not explicitly include deregulation, despite advice from the Fire Brigades Union, representatives of the bereaved, survivors and residents, and some other interested parties.
If they are serious about “leaving no stone unturned” then we need a wide-ranging public inquiry that takes in the systematic attacks on legislation, so-called ‘red tape’, privatisation, contracting out – in short, about deregulation.
The de-regulation of fire safety needs to be reversed and handed back to the The deregulation of fire safety is essential in understanding how a death trap was created at Grenfell Tower, writes Matt Wrack
Why was the Grenfell Tower fire allowed to happen? This is the central question that the Grenfell Tower Inquiry must answer.
To get to the bottom of the issues, the public inquiry must address the whole fire safety regime and in particular the process of deregulation established over recent decades. Sadly, prime minister Theresa May and inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick decided that the terms of reference would not explicitly include deregulation, despite advice from the Fire Brigades Union, representatives of the bereaved, survivors and residents, and some other interested parties.
If they are serious about “leaving no stone unturned” then we need a wide-ranging public inquiry that takes in the systematic attacks on legislation, so-called ‘red tape’, privatisation, contracting out – in short, about deregulation.
There is a reluctance amongst the general public to criticise the Fire Service in any way.
This is also true of the NHS.
In both cases they do an extremely difficult job, often under horrendous circumstances, and are subjected to conditions that the overwhelming majority of the general public are grateful for avoiding.
In both cases they see some awful sights, and are expected to deal with the results of some terrible accidents.
I cant claim to be an expert in either field.
It seems that the major criticism in the Grenfell case, was of the leadership.
The criticism centres around the stay put advice.
This advice is dependent upon compartmentation.
Yet despite the fact that the fire was obviously out of control, and compartmentation had failed, they continued with the stay put advice.
There is obviously a question mark over the leaderships ability to adapt to the conditions that prevailed.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating. The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
I really don't think the hindsight argument stands up, as the advice was changed later.
The point the report made was that had the advice been changed earlier, lives would have been saved.
I was interested to note that in the Harry Dunn thread, that not one person pointed to the fact that he was left dying in a ditch for 43 minutes, waiting for the ambulance to arrive. Nobody chose to make the point that if the 999 call had not been mishandled, that he might be still alive.
Harry Dunn ‘left to die in ditch’ after 999 handlers ‘wrongly categorised’ call
Harry Dunn’s injuries were not considered life-threatening by emergency call handlers, despite ‘breaking every major bone’ in a collision described as a ‘crash fireball’. The 19-year-old – who allegedly collided with an American diplomat’s wife driving on the wrong side of the road – was forced to wait for paramedics for 43 minutes after the emergency call was ‘wrongly categorised’
The PA news agency understands that the first call made by a witness to the collision was put in category two, which are incidents of a potentially serious condition, by ambulance staff – which estimates a waiting time of 40 minutes for patients. If the teenager’s condition was considered as category one – which is described as life-threatening and needing immediate intervention – ambulance crews should aim to attend in seven minutes, under NHS England guidelines.
I was actually going to mention the latter, along with the sensationalism from the media. “She killed him” ...later died in hospital after a lengthy delay bythe paramedics getting to the scene. “ killed in a fireball”, doubtful, unless his bike was layed down. Highly likely he went over the top, or same but clipping the car. I’d be surprised if there was just the one call made? Aren’t there paramedics on motor bikes in that area? This story could run for years.
The delay in getting to the scene is probably what Trump is referring to as “ compelling “.
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
In my opinion the blame for this tragedy lies firmly and squarely with Kensington and Chelsea Council.It's a known fact that they chose to use a cheaper inferior cladding which was inadequate for the purpose required.The people who made those decisions must surely be made to explain the reasons behind their reckoning,though I think we can all assume the main reason.A £2 per square metre saving and a total of £5000 saved doesn't seem such a good deal now does it?
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
I think that much of what you complain about is to be covered in the next phase of the report. The pros and cons of the cladding will be covered then. Whether of not the cladding was legal, had no bearing on the Fire Service response. You surely cant argue that their response depended on the legality of the cladding. They had to respond to the prevailing conditions. The make up of the cladding clearly had an effect on the fire. The Fire Service immediate response took no account of this effect. Although the advice clearly changed much later. The report merely points out that, had the advice been changed sooner, that lives would have been saved. So this clearly goes against your hindsight argument, because the Fire Service advice changed during the course of the fire. The leadership was able to see that the stay put advice was incorrect in this case. They just took far too long to reach this decision. The criticism made was directed at the leadership, rather than the firefighters. The compartmentalisation which prompts the stay put advice, had obviously failed in this case, yet they stuck to the stay put advice. The fact that the illegal make up of the cladding, caused this failure is irrelevant to the fire service response. Although you would hope that the installation of this cladding may result in some criminal convictions, subsequent to phase 2 of the inquiry.
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
I think that much of what you complain about is to be covered in the next phase of the report. The pros and cons of the cladding will be covered then. Whether of not the cladding was legal, had no bearing on the Fire Service response. You surely cant argue that their response depended on the legality of the cladding. They had to respond to the prevailing conditions. The make up of the cladding clearly had an effect on the fire. The Fire Service immediate response took no account of this effect. Although the advice clearly changed much later. The report merely points out that, had the advice been changed sooner, that lives would have been saved. So this clearly goes against your hindsight argument, because the Fire Service advice changed during the course of the fire. The leadership was able to see that the stay put advice was incorrect in this case. They just took far too long to reach this decision. The criticism made was directed at the leadership, rather than the firefighters. The compartmentalisation which prompts the stay put advice, had obviously failed in this case, yet they stuck to the stay put advice. The fact that the illegal make up of the cladding, caused this failure is irrelevant to the fire service response. Although you would hope that the installation of this cladding may result in some criminal convictions, subsequent to phase 2 of the inquiry.
The fire service undergo vigorous training, years of dealing with different circumstances of fires, years of knowledge of how fires react in circumstances, years of making improvements in fire safety, years of lobbying different governments to improve building regs ., are you saying they should now ignore all of that, and change their policies to put in place a “ just in case system” for shysters who penny pinch and ignore all the regulations and build with flammable materials ?
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
I think that much of what you complain about is to be covered in the next phase of the report. The pros and cons of the cladding will be covered then. Whether of not the cladding was legal, had no bearing on the Fire Service response. You surely cant argue that their response depended on the legality of the cladding. They had to respond to the prevailing conditions. The make up of the cladding clearly had an effect on the fire. The Fire Service immediate response took no account of this effect. Although the advice clearly changed much later. The report merely points out that, had the advice been changed sooner, that lives would have been saved. So this clearly goes against your hindsight argument, because the Fire Service advice changed during the course of the fire. The leadership was able to see that the stay put advice was incorrect in this case. They just took far too long to reach this decision. The criticism made was directed at the leadership, rather than the firefighters. The compartmentalisation which prompts the stay put advice, had obviously failed in this case, yet they stuck to the stay put advice. The fact that the illegal make up of the cladding, caused this failure is irrelevant to the fire service response. Although you would hope that the installation of this cladding may result in some criminal convictions, subsequent to phase 2 of the inquiry.
The fire service undergo vigorous training, years of dealing with different circumstances of fires, years of knowledge of how fires react in circumstances, years of making improvements in fire safety, years of lobbying different governments to improve building regs ., are you saying they should now ignore all of that, and change their policies to put in place a “ just in case system” for shysters who penny pinch and ignore all the regulations and build with flammable materials ?
Talk about a race to the bottom..
No, I am not saying anything.
Nor do I think that I know more than, or are cleverer than the ex-judge that has presided over the public enquiry over the last couple of years.
I am just pointing out aspects of the independent report that you are in denial over.
The Fire Service may well have a handbook which details how they should react in certain instances.
Unfortunately there are many occasions in life, where things dont occur exactly as per any handbook.
On these occasions where events don't conform exactly to the handbook, we rely on leaders to make decisions, and improvise, based on the prevailing conditions, and circumstances.
In a nutshell the Fire Service seem to have treated the fire at Grenfell, as they would have a fire at any tower block, that didn't have the illegal cladding.
The problem was Grenfell did have the cladding installed.
They were aware that this cladding made a difference, as much later on they changed their advice.
The inquiry came to the conclusion that the delay in changing their advice, unfortunately cost lives.
It is surely pointless to have the opinion that had the cladding not existed, their actions would have been beyond reproach.
Fewer people may have died in Grenfell Tower if the London Fire Brigade had not stuck so rigidly to its "stay put" policy and evacuated people instead, a public inquiry into the blaze that killed 72 people has concluded.
In a document spanning around 1,000 pages, Sir Martin Moore-Bick said there were "serious shortcomings" and "systemic" failures in its response to the fire.
But it reserves most of its criticism for the London Fire Brigade (LFB), which it says failed to educate its firefighters in the dangers associated with combustible cladding systems. It also failed to visit the block following the refurbishment to ensure the assessment of the risks it presented was accurate and up to date, the report adds.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating. The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
It says: “Once it was clear that the fire was out of control and that compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to organise the evacuation of the tower while that remained possible.
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
I think that much of what you complain about is to be covered in the next phase of the report. The pros and cons of the cladding will be covered then. Whether of not the cladding was legal, had no bearing on the Fire Service response. You surely cant argue that their response depended on the legality of the cladding. They had to respond to the prevailing conditions. The make up of the cladding clearly had an effect on the fire. The Fire Service immediate response took no account of this effect. Although the advice clearly changed much later. The report merely points out that, had the advice been changed sooner, that lives would have been saved. So this clearly goes against your hindsight argument, because the Fire Service advice changed during the course of the fire. The leadership was able to see that the stay put advice was incorrect in this case. They just took far too long to reach this decision. The criticism made was directed at the leadership, rather than the firefighters. The compartmentalisation which prompts the stay put advice, had obviously failed in this case, yet they stuck to the stay put advice. The fact that the illegal make up of the cladding, caused this failure is irrelevant to the fire service response. Although you would hope that the installation of this cladding may result in some criminal convictions, subsequent to phase 2 of the inquiry.
The fire service undergo vigorous training, years of dealing with different circumstances of fires, years of knowledge of how fires react in circumstances, years of making improvements in fire safety, years of lobbying different governments to improve building regs ., are you saying they should now ignore all of that, and change their policies to put in place a “ just in case system” for shysters who penny pinch and ignore all the regulations and build with flammable materials ?
Talk about a race to the bottom..
I find it remarkable that anyone would offer the same stay put advice in both cases below. In the first fire staying put obviously works. In the case of Grenfell it clearly doesn't.
There is a clear difference in the two fires, where it spreads quickly in the case of Grenfell, presumably because of the cladding, and the other fire, where it doesn't spread at all. Even though there is a lot of smoke produced by the other fire, outside of the building, it looks like staying put would definitely be the correct advice. I think that the number of casualties in each case, clearly proves the point. Just looking at both buildings after the event is clear evidence that the same advice was not applicable in both cases.
I’ve got two mates that have just retired from the fire service. They say they often got surprised by fires, not knowing if there are any accelerants inside or not. Unfortunately in this case, the cladding was one. It’s very difficult to compare fires, as you can’t see the levels of toxicity. Some did escape Grenfell, some got rescued, some didn’t make it. I’d doubt if we’ll ever know if some could have saved themselves,unless there was cctv on the stairs and landings. As for who the blame lies with, no comment, for a change. You only need one gulp of poisonous fumes to render you unconscious. I did think the other day if it was me in there. If I opened the door and thought I could get down to the ground ,I’d give it a go. If I had kids with me, or maybe elderly relatives, suddenly things change.
I’ve got two mates that have just retired from the fire service. They say they often got surprised by fires, not knowing if there are any accelerants inside or not. Unfortunately in this case, the cladding was one. It’s very difficult to compare fires, as you can’t see the levels of toxicity. Some did escape Grenfell, some got rescued, some didn’t make it. I’d doubt if we’ll ever know if some could have saved themselves,unless there was cctv on the stairs and landings. As for who the blame lies with, no comment, for a change.
I don't want to keep repeating myself but,
The Fire Service realised because of the effect of the cladding that the stay put advice was incorrect, and changed it much later. The inquiry found that had this been done earlier lives would have been saved. Also some people were told to stay put, whilst others were later assisted in evacuating. One who lost five family members spoke of a family on the floor above, who were helped to evacuate immediately after he was told to stay put, by the same fireman that told him to stay put.
Comments
What would YOUR advice be on the tragic day?
Or even now , with hindsight , one stairway, firefighters using it, What would YOUR advice be?
S
Grenfell Tower report: Fire service's 'stay put' advice cost lives, long awaited public inquiry concludes
Fewer people may have died in Grenfell Tower if the London Fire Brigade had not stuck so rigidly to its "stay put" policy and evacuated people instead, a public inquiry into the blaze that killed 72 people has concluded.
In a document spanning around 1,000 pages, Sir Martin Moore-Bick said there were "serious shortcomings" and "systemic" failures in its response to the fire.
But it reserves most of its criticism for the London Fire Brigade (LFB), which it says failed to educate its firefighters in the dangers associated with combustible cladding systems.
It also failed to visit the block following the refurbishment to ensure the assessment of the risks it presented was accurate and up to date, the report adds.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating.
The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
It says: “Once it was clear that the fire was out of control and that compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to organise the evacuation of the tower while that remained possible.
“That decision could and should have been made between 1.30am and 1.50am and would be likely to have resulted in fewer fatalities.”
But it does criticise the commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, Dany Cotton, for her evidence to the public inquiry last year, when she said she would change nothing about the LFB’s response. This was “remarkably insensitive”, it says.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower-london-cladding-public-inquiry-report-martin-moore-bick-a9175291.html
Once again, those truly responsible for covering a tower block in flammable material appear to get off scott free.
Yeah, let's just blame the firefighters and the people who died.
Why was the Grenfell Tower fire allowed to happen? This is the central question that the Grenfell Tower Inquiry must answer.
To get to the bottom of the issues, the public inquiry must address the whole fire safety regime and in particular the process of deregulation established over recent decades. Sadly, prime minister Theresa May and inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick decided that the terms of reference would not explicitly include deregulation, despite advice from the Fire Brigades Union, representatives of the bereaved, survivors and residents, and some other interested parties.
If they are serious about “leaving no stone unturned” then we need a wide-ranging public inquiry that takes in the systematic attacks on legislation, so-called ‘red tape’, privatisation, contracting out – in short, about deregulation.
There is a reluctance amongst the general public to criticise the Fire Service in any way.
This is also true of the NHS.
In both cases they do an extremely difficult job, often under horrendous circumstances, and are subjected to conditions that the overwhelming majority of the general public are grateful for avoiding.
In both cases they see some awful sights, and are expected to deal with the results of some terrible accidents.
I cant claim to be an expert in either field.
It seems that the major criticism in the Grenfell case, was of the leadership.
The criticism centres around the stay put advice.
This advice is dependent upon compartmentation.
Yet despite the fact that the fire was obviously out of control, and compartmentation had failed, they continued with the stay put advice.
There is obviously a question mark over the leaderships ability to adapt to the conditions that prevailed.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating.
The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
I really don't think the hindsight argument stands up, as the advice was changed later.
The point the report made was that had the advice been changed earlier, lives would have been saved.
I was interested to note that in the Harry Dunn thread, that not one person pointed to the fact that he was left dying in a ditch for 43 minutes, waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
Nobody chose to make the point that if the 999 call had not been mishandled, that he might be still alive.
Harry Dunn ‘left to die in ditch’ after 999 handlers ‘wrongly categorised’ call
Harry Dunn’s injuries were not considered life-threatening by emergency call handlers, despite ‘breaking every major bone’ in a collision described as a ‘crash fireball’. The 19-year-old – who allegedly collided with an American diplomat’s wife driving on the wrong side of the road – was forced to wait for paramedics for 43 minutes after the emergency call was ‘wrongly categorised’
The PA news agency understands that the first call made by a witness to the collision was put in category two, which are incidents of a potentially serious condition, by ambulance staff – which estimates a waiting time of 40 minutes for patients. If the teenager’s condition was considered as category one – which is described as life-threatening and needing immediate intervention – ambulance crews should aim to attend in seven minutes, under NHS England guidelines.
Read more: https://metro.co.uk/2019/11/06/harry-dunn-left-die-ditch-999-handlers-wrongly-categorised-call-11054291/?ito=cbshare
Twitter: https://twitter.com/MetroUK | Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MetroUK/
“She killed him” ...later died in hospital after a lengthy delay bythe paramedics getting to the scene.
“ killed in a fireball”, doubtful, unless his bike was layed down. Highly likely he went over the top, or same but clipping the car.
I’d be surprised if there was just the one call made?
Aren’t there paramedics on motor bikes in that area?
This story could run for years.
The delay in getting to the scene is probably what Trump is referring to as “ compelling “.
What irks me, is that the whole “ How can we avoid this happening in the future” bull....
First thing what seems to be happening is have an enquiry that lasts for years, when it’s in the public domain that the cladding wasn’t suitable, all buildings with that cladding need urgent attention, is that happening?
Secondly, let’s find a scapegoat, ah the fire service , that’ll do... ignoring the facts about the cladding which brings into question a policy used for years on buildings which have appropriate building regs and safe as possible materials used for construction.
Thirdly , let’s ignore the de-regulation of fire safety checks which... if the professional fire service still did would stand a better chance of highlighting potential issues.
Finally, if the policy was changed at the time he suggests , whose to say what would have happened, in a burning building trying to see and breath on the exit.
If you live in a high rise building which has been constructed using flammable materials, the real guilty parties are the ones that made and suggested the cladding was appropriate for this purpose and the ones who signed it off not using due diligence .
I’m not holding my breath for any persons truly responsible for these acts to be held to account in the second part of the enquiry.
The pros and cons of the cladding will be covered then.
Whether of not the cladding was legal, had no bearing on the Fire Service response.
You surely cant argue that their response depended on the legality of the cladding.
They had to respond to the prevailing conditions.
The make up of the cladding clearly had an effect on the fire.
The Fire Service immediate response took no account of this effect.
Although the advice clearly changed much later.
The report merely points out that, had the advice been changed sooner, that lives would have been saved.
So this clearly goes against your hindsight argument, because the Fire Service advice changed during the course of the fire.
The leadership was able to see that the stay put advice was incorrect in this case.
They just took far too long to reach this decision.
The criticism made was directed at the leadership, rather than the firefighters.
The compartmentalisation which prompts the stay put advice, had obviously failed in this case, yet they stuck to the stay put advice.
The fact that the illegal make up of the cladding, caused this failure is irrelevant to the fire service response.
Although you would hope that the installation of this cladding may result in some criminal convictions, subsequent to phase 2 of the inquiry.
Talk about a race to the bottom..
No, I am not saying anything.
Nor do I think that I know more than, or are cleverer than the ex-judge that has presided over the public enquiry over the last couple of years.
I am just pointing out aspects of the independent report that you are in denial over.
The Fire Service may well have a handbook which details how they should react in certain instances.
Unfortunately there are many occasions in life, where things dont occur exactly as per any handbook.
On these occasions where events don't conform exactly to the handbook, we rely on leaders to make decisions, and improvise, based on the prevailing conditions, and circumstances.
In a nutshell the Fire Service seem to have treated the fire at Grenfell, as they would have a fire at any tower block, that didn't have the illegal cladding.
The problem was Grenfell did have the cladding installed.
They were aware that this cladding made a difference, as much later on they changed their advice.
The inquiry came to the conclusion that the delay in changing their advice, unfortunately cost lives.
It is surely pointless to have the opinion that had the cladding not existed, their actions would have been beyond reproach.
Fewer people may have died in Grenfell Tower if the London Fire Brigade had not stuck so rigidly to its "stay put" policy and evacuated people instead, a public inquiry into the blaze that killed 72 people has concluded.
In a document spanning around 1,000 pages, Sir Martin Moore-Bick said there were "serious shortcomings" and "systemic" failures in its response to the fire.
But it reserves most of its criticism for the London Fire Brigade (LFB), which it says failed to educate its firefighters in the dangers associated with combustible cladding systems.
It also failed to visit the block following the refurbishment to ensure the assessment of the risks it presented was accurate and up to date, the report adds.
Condemning the brigade's "stay put" policy, it says this meant dozens of people stayed inside the building rather than evacuating.
The report describes the measure as an “article of faith” within the LFB, “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”.
It says: “Once it was clear that the fire was out of control and that compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to organise the evacuation of the tower while that remained possible.
In the first fire staying put obviously works.
In the case of Grenfell it clearly doesn't.
Shepherds Bush.
Grenfell.
Even though there is a lot of smoke produced by the other fire, outside of the building, it looks like staying put would definitely be the correct advice.
I think that the number of casualties in each case, clearly proves the point.
Just looking at both buildings after the event is clear evidence that the same advice was not applicable in both cases.
They say they often got surprised by fires, not knowing if there are any accelerants inside or not.
Unfortunately in this case, the cladding was one.
It’s very difficult to compare fires, as you can’t see the levels of toxicity.
Some did escape Grenfell, some got rescued, some didn’t make it.
I’d doubt if we’ll ever know if some could have saved themselves,unless there was cctv on the stairs and landings.
As for who the blame lies with, no comment, for a change.
You only need one gulp of poisonous fumes to render you unconscious.
I did think the other day if it was me in there.
If I opened the door and thought I could get down to the ground ,I’d give it a go.
If I had kids with me, or maybe elderly relatives, suddenly things change.
The Fire Service realised because of the effect of the cladding that the stay put advice was incorrect, and changed it much later.
The inquiry found that had this been done earlier lives would have been saved.
Also some people were told to stay put, whilst others were later assisted in evacuating.
One who lost five family members spoke of a family on the floor above, who were helped to evacuate immediately after he was told to stay put, by the same fireman that told him to stay put.
Is it known how many could have got out?
It’s obvious some instruction was wrong.