It is my belief that the PO were not aware of the enormous burdens placed on people responsible with bringing criminal prosecutions.
And that there will not be any prosecutions brought by the multitude of professionals within the inquiry.
Simply because they do. So the experts who will spend tens of millions of taxpayers money, with a plethora of experts, will chew the fat for years. And berate people for not taking actions that they themselves could do. But won't. Quite deliberately.
And then-only then-pass it on to the police. Who will not have that level of expertise.
It surprises me that those that were the legal representatives of the PO would not have asked the questions, when preparing witnesses, that would have established that remote access was possible, and was indeed a regular occurrence. The key factors were surely that the money was missing, and that only the sub postmaster could be responsible.
Reality is not like that. Lawyers like to win. And there are all sorts of entirely legal ways to seek to achieve that.
I spent a lot of time helping my side win. And the other side was mostly (not quite entirely) for the other side to deal with. Because the Centre Forward doesn't tell the Opposition Centre Half how best to stop him scoring.
I never asked my witnesses questions where I didn't want to know the answer. Unless I knew the other side was likely to ask those questions.
But then I spent nearly all my career dealing with Civil Law.
Wouldnt you have to establish that the money was miissing, and that nobody else could have done it?
No.
In a Civil case you have to prove to the satisfaction of a Judge that your version is more likely that the other side's version. 51%. Not that no other version was possible
On a Criminal case 1 side is trying to prove something beyond reasonable doubt. Whereas the other side is trying to prove that there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt. They do not have to prove innocence.
Various Judges listened to Civil cases and preferred 1 version of events. And various judges decided that there was not reasonable doubt in Criminal cases.
People did prove, to the satisfaction of Judges, that the money was missing. And that it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Defendants had done it.
I appreciate, with 20/20 hindsight, that a lot of those Civil cases may have been decided wrongly. And even more of the Criminal cases may have been.
I also appreciate that people want to use their hindsight to try and pin all the blame on people who only individually had part of the picture, and foresight, as opposed to hindsight.
But life is not that simple.
I wasnt thinking in terms of hindsight. At least some of the defendants were pointing the finger at the Horizon system. The guy that they crushed, bankrupted, and spent 321k in legal costs, phoned the helpline 91 times, was implicating Horizon. I just find it hard to believe that the legal representatives on either side, Fujitsu, or the PO, could not establish that remote access was possible. If the PO legal representatives did become aware that it was possible could they in good conscience continue to defend the position that it wasnt?
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No. "Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
That is simply not true.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No. "Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
I was merely assuming that the legal representatives would as a matter of course, would interview staff from the PO, and Fujitsu that could corroborate both facts, ie that the money was missing, and that nobody else besides the sub postmaster could access the accounts. Also that nobody else had access to their log in. The PO was aware of the bugs in Horizon in 2013, and that Horizon was remotely accessible from the start, as they were instructing Fujitu to do so. Paula Vennells was responsible for removing an admission regarding Horizon bugs from the Royal Mail IPO Prospectus in 2015.
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
That is simply not true.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No. "Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
I was merely assuming that the legal representatives would as a matter of course, would interview staff from the PO, and Fujitsu that could corroborate both facts, ie that the money was missing, and that nobody else besides the sub postmaster could access the accounts. Also that nobody else had access to their log in. The PO was aware of the bugs in Horizon in 2013, and that Horizon was remotely accessible from the start, as they were instructing Fujitu to do so. Paula Vennells was responsible for removing an admission regarding Horizon bugs from the Royal Mail IPO Prospectus in 2015.
There were also aware of the Fujitsu experts omissions in his testimony in 2013.
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No. "Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
Post Office lied and threatened BBC over Horizon whistleblower
The Post Office threatened and lied to the BBC in a failed effort to suppress key evidence that helped clear postmasters in the Horizon scandal.
Senior managers tried to smear postmasters before Panorama broadcast an interview in 2015 with a Fujitsu whistleblower.
Former insider Richard Roll revealed accounts on the Horizon computer system could be secretly altered.
The BBC can reveal that in the period leading up to the broadcast of Trouble at the Post Office, the 2015 Panorama programme featuring the whistleblower testimony:
Experts interviewed by the BBC were sent intimidating letters by Post Office lawyers about their participation in the programme
Senior Post Office managers briefed the BBC that neither their staff nor Fujitsu - the company which built and maintained the Horizon system - could remotely access sub-postmasters' accounts, even though Post Office directors had been warned four years earlier that such remote access was possible
Lawyers for the Post Office sent letters threatening to sue Panorama and the company's public relations boss Mark Davies escalated complaints to ever more senior BBC managers
The Post Office's false claims did not stop the programme, but they did cause the BBC to delay the broadcast by several weeks.
The Post Office's false claims did not stop the programme, but they did cause the BBC to delay the broadcast by several weeks.
Documents submitted to the ongoing public inquiry reveal how that small victory was celebrated by Post Office senior management. Then-chief executive Paula Vennells congratulated Mark Davies and his PR team on their "extensive work".
This was just the latest in a long line of lobbying, misinformation and outright lies that had faced a small number of BBC journalists trying to uncover the truth about the Post Office scandal.
It began in 2011, when then-BBC regional reporter Nick Wallis first interviewed Jo Hamilton, played by Monica Dolan in the ITV drama Mr Bates v The Post Office. She told him how the Horizon computer system had made money seem to vanish from the tills at her branch in Hampshire.
The Post Office said there was "no evidence pointing to any fault in the technology".
By 2014, Nick Wallis and producer Tim Robinson were investigating new claims - for BBC regional investigative programme Inside Out - that staff at Fujitsu were able to remotely tamper with Horizon accounts.
They interviewed sub-postmaster Michael Rudkin, played by Shaun Dooley in the TV drama, who said he had seen Fujitsu staff tampering with accounts on a visit to the company's head office
The Post Office told the BBC journalists at the time there was "no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu to edit, manipulate or remove transaction data" and that it had found "no evidence" to suggest that convictions were unsafe.
We now know that 18 months before this statement, a barrister had warned senior Post Office managers a number of prosecutions might be unsafe because of bugs in the system that had not been disclosed in court cases against the sub-postmasters.
Rather than admit the truth, the Post Office continued to spread misinformation.
And minutes of a Post Office meeting later uncovered in court show its PR boss Mark Davies directly lobbied senior BBC management to try to stop further negative coverage of the story.
"While we are able to withstand this current level of interest, it is resource intensive. We have made representations to the director of BBC News and Current Affairs," Mr Davies told colleagues.
The Post Office cover-up was holding, but Alan Bates - the hero of the ITV drama - had another card to play.
At a meeting in a garden centre tea room in Shrewsbury, he told Nick Wallis he had been contacted by a whistleblower from Fujitsu - who knew the truth about Horizon and remote access.
That man was Richard Roll, who had worked for Fujitsu on the Post Office's Horizon computer system in the early 2000s.
Mr Bates wanted Panorama to take on the story, so Nick introduced the whistleblower to the programme team.
For the 2015 programme, he told Panorama reporter John Sweeney on camera how a team of Fujitsu staff had remote access to branch accounts and could make changes to them without the sub-postmasters' knowledge.
It was explosive testimony that could call into question the convictions of more than 700 sub-postmasters prosecuted on the basis of Horizon evidence, as the denial of the possibility of remote access underpinned the Post Office's legal position.
The Post Office was going to fight hard to stop the story from coming out - its misinformation campaign ramped up a gear.
'Enormous regret' Panorama journalists Matt Bardo and Tim Robinson were invited to Post Office HQ for an on-the-record briefing about the Horizon system.
Network manager Angela van den Bogerd joined PR boss Mark Davies and another senior manager, Patrick Bourke.
Ms van den Bogerd insisted nobody could change the sub-postmasters' accounts without their knowledge.
She said any alterations "would leave a footprint. And that's the important bit."
Matt Bardo asked: "So in sum, it is not now and never has been possible for anybody from Post Office or Fujitsu to interfere with transactions, without the clear knowledge of the sub-postmaster?"
Mr Bourke said: "It is 100% true to say we can't change, alter, modify, existing transaction data, so the integrity is 100% preserved."
"And that's true now and has been for the duration of the system?" Mr Bardo asked. "Yeah," said Ms van den Bogerd.
That wasn't true. Not then, and not for the duration of the system.
Since then, the Post Office has been forced to accept that Fujitsu staff could access and change accounts without the sub-postmasters' knowledge.
One of the Post Office's lawyers suggested in 2019 that Angela van den Bogerd and her colleagues had denied remote access was possible because they did not know at the time. He told the High Court: "It is a matter of enormous regret that the senior managers who dealt with Panorama were not aware that remote access to Horizon was possible."
But documents Panorama obtained for a follow-up programme in 2020 show the Post Office had known it was possible for years.
A report by consultants Ernst and Young sent to Post Office directors in 2011 warned that Fujitsu staff had "unrestricted access" to sub-postmasters' accounts, that "may lead to the processing of unauthorised or erroneous transactions".
The misleading on-the-record briefing was just the first step in the Post Office's onslaught to frustrate the 2015 Panorama investigation.
When it learned the names of experts Panorama was interviewing, lawyers and senior managers sent them intimidating letters.
Ian Henderson, from the independent forensic accountants Second Sight, had uncovered other evidence of miscarriages of justice at the Post Office. He was warned he did not have the legal expertise to comment on prosecutions and the Post Office threatened to sue him.
"If your statements go as far as to harm Post Office's reputation then we may have to take even more serious action in order to protect our brand," he was told. "For the avoidance of doubt, Post Office does not condone you speaking to Panorama and all our legal rights are fully reserved."
To protect the whistleblower from similar correspondence, the Panorama team did not tell the Post Office Richard Roll's name. Instead, the journalists said they had spoken to a Fujitsu insider, and outlined the allegations he was making.
Smears and false claims From the Post Office's response, it was clear that the whistleblower's evidence which would be featured in the film was of particular concern.
PR boss Mark Davies fired off complaints to ever more senior managers at the BBC, and expensive external lawyers were hired with public money to send letters threatening to sue Panorama.
The programme team received hundreds of pages of correspondence and reports from the Post Office and their lawyers - but none of the paperwork admitted remote access was possible.
At the time, Mr Davies told Panorama "there is overwhelming evidence that the losses complained of were caused by user actions, including deliberate dishonest conduct".
The Post Office's lobbying did secure them a further meeting, this time an off-the-record briefing with the programme's then-editor. Such meetings are viewed with suspicion by many investigative journalists as they can be used as a tactic to hamper inquiries and publication.
So it proved in this case. The Post Office took the opportunity to smear some of the sub-postmasters Panorama was planning to feature in its programme, hinting at potential motives to steal from the tills.
In one case, it falsely claimed it had documents showing a postmaster was guilty of theft. But it said it would only show them to the programme team if they promised not to share them with anyone else - which meant Panorama would not even be able to discuss them with the postmaster who had been accused.
Panorama refused. The team reviewed all the available evidence, which delayed the broadcast. But nothing was found that cast doubt on the sub-postmasters' stories and the film aired in August 2015.
It can often be a struggle to get a Panorama to air. It's not unusual for big companies and wealthy individuals to mount intensive legal and lobbying efforts to protect their reputations. But for the programme team, this was a battle like few others - and it was a government-owned institution that was waging the war.
The Post Office had failed to stop Richard Roll's story being told, but it still sought to reduce its impact.
After the programme aired, the Post Office immediately published a statement on its website that said it would be complaining to the BBC about the "unsubstantiated allegations that continue to be made".
Richard Roll's allegations were not picked up by the rest of the media and his testimony did not spark the national outrage that has followed ITV's drama.
Post Office CEO Paula Vennells reported back to the government body which owns the Post Office that "the programme contained no new information and received almost no pick-up from other media". Mrs Vennells made no mention of the new information provided by the whistleblower.
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No. "Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
That article adds some perspective. The Ernst and Young report of 2011 leaves little doubt that they were made aware then.
Secret papers reveal Post Office knew its court defence was false
This raises questions as to whether Post Office lawyers met their responsibilities to not mislead the court.
In July 2017, the Post Office filed a defence document as part of the case. It included some findings from Bramble - in some cases word-for-word - while omitting where they came from and other key elements from the draft report.
Despite what is set out in Bramble, this defence document - which is accompanied by a signed statement of truth - stated that it would be "impossible" for Fujitsu to remotely cause "significant shortfalls".
In the defence, the Post Office conceded that a "small number" of Fujitsu employees had user rights to alter transactions but stated users were strictly controlled.
But in Bramble, Deloitte said it was "impossible" to know which Fujitsu staff had this unrestricted access prior to 2015 because there were no records of who they were or what they did.
He added: "It's them admitting that they could do in 2017 something they were still denying that they could do in 2019."
The branches examined in Bramble by Deloitte belonged to 91 sub-postmasters involved in the Bates case - including people who had been jailed for theft because of shortfalls.
Person with precisely zero experience or relevant qualifications believes it is simple. Person with 35 years' experience, plus a stack of legal qualifications believes it is complicated.
You have fixed beliefs. And honestly believe that the evidence you consider is important makes matters simple.
If it were actually the case that you thought something was simple and I did not, it is entirely possible you might be right and I might be wrong. Similarly, if you believe that enormous progress has been made and I do not, you might be right. And I may be wrong.
Thing is, you are not arguing with me. It is possible you might know more than me. You are arguing with what has actually happened.
25 years since the start. 20 years since that guy was bankrupted. 11 years since a £3 Billion Public Offering, when there would have been all sorts of digging. 5 years since a Judge gave an important ruling. And 2 years still to come before a file might be passed to the Police to investigate whether persons unknown should be charged
A lot of people questioned in depth about all of this. At massive expense. A lot of people due to be questioned, some of which are refusing to co-operate.
It could be that you know more than me about this. Unlikely. But possible.
How likely is it that, 5 years into a review by experts who know far more than me of things that largely happened 20+ years ago, that it is simple?
Person with precisely zero experience or relevant qualifications believes it is simple. Person with 35 years' experience, plus a stack of legal qualifications believes it is complicated.
You have fixed beliefs. And honestly believe that the evidence you consider is important makes matters simple.
If it were actually the case that you thought something was simple and I did not, it is entirely possible you might be right and I might be wrong. Similarly, if you believe that enormous progress has been made and I do not, you might be right. And I may be wrong.
Thing is, you are not arguing with me. It is possible you might know more than me. You are arguing with what has actually happened.
25 years since the start. 20 years since that guy was bankrupted. 11 years since a £3 Billion Public Offering, when there would have been all sorts of digging. 5 years since a Judge gave an important ruling. And 2 years still to come before a file might be passed to the Police to investigate whether persons unknown should be charged
A lot of people questioned in depth about all of this. At massive expense. A lot of people due to be questioned, some of which are refusing to co-operate.
It could be that you know more than me about this. Unlikely. But possible.
How likely is it that, 5 years into a review by experts who know far more than me of things that largely happened 20+ years ago, that it is simple?
A report by consultants Ernst and Young sent to Post Office directors in 2011 warned that Fujitsu staff had "unrestricted access" to sub-postmasters' accounts, that "may lead to the processing of unauthorised or erroneous transactions".
Comments
At least some of the defendants were pointing the finger at the Horizon system.
The guy that they crushed, bankrupted, and spent 321k in legal costs, phoned the helpline 91 times, was implicating Horizon.
I just find it hard to believe that the legal representatives on either side, Fujitsu, or the PO, could not establish that remote access was possible.
If the PO legal representatives did become aware that it was possible could they in good conscience continue to defend the position that it wasnt?
Some things are likely to have happened for about 20 years before being discovered. And an enquiry is spending millions in the 5 years or so since without getting particularly far.
Your questions are simple ones. The answers clearly are not.
Defendants nearly always point the finger at the computer system, or whatever device suggests their guilt.
You presuppose that the people who knew or suspected stuff were the same ones who were involved in the Court cases. If that were true, this matter would have been simple.
If 1 of the Lawyers had got to the point that they felt the need to point out to their paymasters (Client or Employer) real risks in relation to (in particular) current Civil cases or past Criminal cases, this would have been long resolved.
1 of the things we are left with is whether 1 or more of the Lawyers should have got to that point above.
I don't know the answer to that 1. But we might find out.
your last sentence begins with the word "if". Little word. Big meaning.
I think the answer to your last sentence is No. They did not. But that is the simple question. The rather more complex question is
"Did they or should they (any of the Lawyers) have recommended reviewing past civil cases or criminal convictions?"
And it looks like the answer to "did they" is No.
"Should they?" I don't know. But I think that is the key question.
Also that nobody else had access to their log in.
The PO was aware of the bugs in Horizon in 2013, and that Horizon was remotely accessible from the start, as they were instructing Fujitu to do so.
Paula Vennells was responsible for removing an admission regarding Horizon bugs from the Royal Mail IPO Prospectus in 2015.
The Post Office threatened and lied to the BBC in a failed effort to suppress key evidence that helped clear postmasters in the Horizon scandal.
Senior managers tried to smear postmasters before Panorama broadcast an interview in 2015 with a Fujitsu whistleblower.
Former insider Richard Roll revealed accounts on the Horizon computer system could be secretly altered.
The BBC can reveal that in the period leading up to the broadcast of Trouble at the Post Office, the 2015 Panorama programme featuring the whistleblower testimony:
Experts interviewed by the BBC were sent intimidating letters by Post Office lawyers about their participation in the programme
Senior Post Office managers briefed the BBC that neither their staff nor Fujitsu - the company which built and maintained the Horizon system - could remotely access sub-postmasters' accounts, even though Post Office directors had been warned four years earlier that such remote access was possible
Lawyers for the Post Office sent letters threatening to sue Panorama and the company's public relations boss Mark Davies escalated complaints to ever more senior BBC managers
The Post Office's false claims did not stop the programme, but they did cause the BBC to delay the broadcast by several weeks.
The Post Office's false claims did not stop the programme, but they did cause the BBC to delay the broadcast by several weeks.
Documents submitted to the ongoing public inquiry reveal how that small victory was celebrated by Post Office senior management. Then-chief executive Paula Vennells congratulated Mark Davies and his PR team on their "extensive work".
This was just the latest in a long line of lobbying, misinformation and outright lies that had faced a small number of BBC journalists trying to uncover the truth about the Post Office scandal.
It began in 2011, when then-BBC regional reporter Nick Wallis first interviewed Jo Hamilton, played by Monica Dolan in the ITV drama Mr Bates v The Post Office. She told him how the Horizon computer system had made money seem to vanish from the tills at her branch in Hampshire.
The Post Office said there was "no evidence pointing to any fault in the technology".
By 2014, Nick Wallis and producer Tim Robinson were investigating new claims - for BBC regional investigative programme Inside Out - that staff at Fujitsu were able to remotely tamper with Horizon accounts.
They interviewed sub-postmaster Michael Rudkin, played by Shaun Dooley in the TV drama, who said he had seen Fujitsu staff tampering with accounts on a visit to the company's head office
The Post Office told the BBC journalists at the time there was "no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu to edit, manipulate or remove transaction data" and that it had found "no evidence" to suggest that convictions were unsafe.
We now know that 18 months before this statement, a barrister had warned senior Post Office managers a number of prosecutions might be unsafe because of bugs in the system that had not been disclosed in court cases against the sub-postmasters.
Rather than admit the truth, the Post Office continued to spread misinformation.
And minutes of a Post Office meeting later uncovered in court show its PR boss Mark Davies directly lobbied senior BBC management to try to stop further negative coverage of the story.
"While we are able to withstand this current level of interest, it is resource intensive. We have made representations to the director of BBC News and Current Affairs," Mr Davies told colleagues.
The Post Office cover-up was holding, but Alan Bates - the hero of the ITV drama - had another card to play.
At a meeting in a garden centre tea room in Shrewsbury, he told Nick Wallis he had been contacted by a whistleblower from Fujitsu - who knew the truth about Horizon and remote access.
That man was Richard Roll, who had worked for Fujitsu on the Post Office's Horizon computer system in the early 2000s.
Mr Bates wanted Panorama to take on the story, so Nick introduced the whistleblower to the programme team.
For the 2015 programme, he told Panorama reporter John Sweeney on camera how a team of Fujitsu staff had remote access to branch accounts and could make changes to them without the sub-postmasters' knowledge.
It was explosive testimony that could call into question the convictions of more than 700 sub-postmasters prosecuted on the basis of Horizon evidence, as the denial of the possibility of remote access underpinned the Post Office's legal position.
The Post Office was going to fight hard to stop the story from coming out - its misinformation campaign ramped up a gear.
'Enormous regret'
Panorama journalists Matt Bardo and Tim Robinson were invited to Post Office HQ for an on-the-record briefing about the Horizon system.
Network manager Angela van den Bogerd joined PR boss Mark Davies and another senior manager, Patrick Bourke.
Ms van den Bogerd insisted nobody could change the sub-postmasters' accounts without their knowledge.
She said any alterations "would leave a footprint. And that's the important bit."
Matt Bardo asked: "So in sum, it is not now and never has been possible for anybody from Post Office or Fujitsu to interfere with transactions, without the clear knowledge of the sub-postmaster?"
Mr Bourke said: "It is 100% true to say we can't change, alter, modify, existing transaction data, so the integrity is 100% preserved."
"And that's true now and has been for the duration of the system?" Mr Bardo asked. "Yeah," said Ms van den Bogerd.
That wasn't true. Not then, and not for the duration of the system.
Since then, the Post Office has been forced to accept that Fujitsu staff could access and change accounts without the sub-postmasters' knowledge.
One of the Post Office's lawyers suggested in 2019 that Angela van den Bogerd and her colleagues had denied remote access was possible because they did not know at the time. He told the High Court: "It is a matter of enormous regret that the senior managers who dealt with Panorama were not aware that remote access to Horizon was possible."
But documents Panorama obtained for a follow-up programme in 2020 show the Post Office had known it was possible for years.
The misleading on-the-record briefing was just the first step in the Post Office's onslaught to frustrate the 2015 Panorama investigation.
When it learned the names of experts Panorama was interviewing, lawyers and senior managers sent them intimidating letters.
Ian Henderson, from the independent forensic accountants Second Sight, had uncovered other evidence of miscarriages of justice at the Post Office. He was warned he did not have the legal expertise to comment on prosecutions and the Post Office threatened to sue him.
"If your statements go as far as to harm Post Office's reputation then we may have to take even more serious action in order to protect our brand," he was told. "For the avoidance of doubt, Post Office does not condone you speaking to Panorama and all our legal rights are fully reserved."
To protect the whistleblower from similar correspondence, the Panorama team did not tell the Post Office Richard Roll's name. Instead, the journalists said they had spoken to a Fujitsu insider, and outlined the allegations he was making.
Smears and false claims
From the Post Office's response, it was clear that the whistleblower's evidence which would be featured in the film was of particular concern.
PR boss Mark Davies fired off complaints to ever more senior managers at the BBC, and expensive external lawyers were hired with public money to send letters threatening to sue Panorama.
The programme team received hundreds of pages of correspondence and reports from the Post Office and their lawyers - but none of the paperwork admitted remote access was possible.
At the time, Mr Davies told Panorama "there is overwhelming evidence that the losses complained of were caused by user actions, including deliberate dishonest conduct".
The Post Office's lobbying did secure them a further meeting, this time an off-the-record briefing with the programme's then-editor. Such meetings are viewed with suspicion by many investigative journalists as they can be used as a tactic to hamper inquiries and publication.
So it proved in this case. The Post Office took the opportunity to smear some of the sub-postmasters Panorama was planning to feature in its programme, hinting at potential motives to steal from the tills.
In one case, it falsely claimed it had documents showing a postmaster was guilty of theft. But it said it would only show them to the programme team if they promised not to share them with anyone else - which meant Panorama would not even be able to discuss them with the postmaster who had been accused.
Panorama refused. The team reviewed all the available evidence, which delayed the broadcast. But nothing was found that cast doubt on the sub-postmasters' stories and the film aired in August 2015.
It can often be a struggle to get a Panorama to air. It's not unusual for big companies and wealthy individuals to mount intensive legal and lobbying efforts to protect their reputations. But for the programme team, this was a battle like few others - and it was a government-owned institution that was waging the war.
The Post Office had failed to stop Richard Roll's story being told, but it still sought to reduce its impact.
After the programme aired, the Post Office immediately published a statement on its website that said it would be complaining to the BBC about the "unsubstantiated allegations that continue to be made".
Richard Roll's allegations were not picked up by the rest of the media and his testimony did not spark the national outrage that has followed ITV's drama.
Post Office CEO Paula Vennells reported back to the government body which owns the Post Office that "the programme contained no new information and received almost no pick-up from other media". Mrs Vennells made no mention of the new information provided by the whistleblower.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67884743
The Ernst and Young report of 2011 leaves little doubt that they were made aware then.
This raises questions as to whether Post Office lawyers met their responsibilities to not mislead the court.
In July 2017, the Post Office filed a defence document as part of the case. It included some findings from Bramble - in some cases word-for-word - while omitting where they came from and other key elements from the draft report.
Despite what is set out in Bramble, this defence document - which is accompanied by a signed statement of truth - stated that it would be "impossible" for Fujitsu to remotely cause "significant shortfalls".
In the defence, the Post Office conceded that a "small number" of Fujitsu employees had user rights to alter transactions but stated users were strictly controlled.
But in Bramble, Deloitte said it was "impossible" to know which Fujitsu staff had this unrestricted access prior to 2015 because there were no records of who they were or what they did.
He added: "It's them admitting that they could do in 2017 something they were still denying that they could do in 2019."
The branches examined in Bramble by Deloitte belonged to 91 sub-postmasters involved in the Bates case - including people who had been jailed for theft because of shortfalls.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-68663750
It is simple. Or it is complicated.
Person with precisely zero experience or relevant qualifications believes it is simple.
Person with 35 years' experience, plus a stack of legal qualifications believes it is complicated.
You have fixed beliefs. And honestly believe that the evidence you consider is important makes matters simple.
If it were actually the case that you thought something was simple and I did not, it is entirely possible you might be right and I might be wrong. Similarly, if you believe that enormous progress has been made and I do not, you might be right. And I may be wrong.
Thing is, you are not arguing with me. It is possible you might know more than me. You are arguing with what has actually happened.
25 years since the start. 20 years since that guy was bankrupted. 11 years since a £3 Billion Public Offering, when there would have been all sorts of digging. 5 years since a Judge gave an important ruling. And 2 years still to come before a file might be passed to the Police to investigate whether persons unknown should be charged
A lot of people questioned in depth about all of this. At massive expense. A lot of people due to be questioned, some of which are refusing to co-operate.
It could be that you know more than me about this. Unlikely. But possible.
How likely is it that, 5 years into a review by experts who know far more than me of things that largely happened 20+ years ago, that it is simple?
https://uk.yahoo.com/news/government-considered-removing-paula-vennells-114723780.html
https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/other/sacking-of-paula-vennells-was-raised-amid-doubts-over-performance-post-office-inquiry-is-told/ar-BB1nK6qH?ocid=msedgntp&pc=NMTS&cvid=5b7adab48f0546bfbc36c3d7b5e6080d&ei=74#fullscreen
https://uk.yahoo.com/news/post-office-campaigner-alan-bates-212300467.html
Good grief, never saw that coming.
Fully deserved of course, but I bet he'd have preferred it if the sub-Postmasters had all been paid their full compo.