I went to an all inclusive holiday to Cypress in 2012 with my family There were numerous Russians there each and everyone of the were rude, barged passed anyone waiting for food they would pick the whole plate up of what ever was there they didn't give a monkeys about anyone The worst thing for me was , there was a football team there all black kids with a black coach from London having a whale of a time in the pool when 5 or 6 Russians stood in a line right next to them doing the naz i salute all with intimidating looks , these were big lads who wanted a confrontation with kids the coach was mortified and i had to calm him down teloing him they were not worth spoiling their holiday over Thats Russians for you , backwards
Good to see a John R Bruning update after a period away. In this briefing, he talks about what I assume is the explanation for why all the rhetoric over the use of nuclear weapons by Russia has calmed down of late.
Strategic/West-Russia Update:
Today, I sat in on a Zoom seminar given by four Stanford nuclear weapons policy scholars. They were pulled together to discuss a central question of the Ukraine crisis: Will Putin use nuclear weapons?
Some takeaways from the discussion:
1. Despite Putin's nuclear saber rattling, there's been no change in posture of the Russian strategic forces. No nuclear weapons have been removed from storage (this is where their tactical weapons are located), and the "special alert" Putin mentioned on Feb. 27th simply added a few extra personnel to the command and control system for their strategic forces. So, the posturing, public comments and CGI videos of the UK & the US getting nuked are not being matched by concrete, threatening moves with the actual missiles. All talk. So far.
2. Scott Sagan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Sagan) pointed out that he believes the likelihood of Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has diminished send the end of February and early March. The disaster in front of Kyiv forced Putin to scale back the war's aims and that, Sagan believes led to a lowering of the chance for nuclear use. IE: nobody is going to use nuclear weapons in a limited war, especially in territory they want to annex.
3. That said, everyone on the panel agreed the West and the U.S. in particular needs to think through what our response would be to a Russian nuclear attack in Eastern Europe. It turns out there is. The Pentagon has created a "Tiger Team" to game board scenarios and come up with responses.
4. Potential NATA/US Responses: It really depends on how the nuclear weapon was employed. Options include: a.) A demonstration use, including in the Black Sea. This is seen as the most unlikely scenario. b.) Military target, such as an airfield or on the battlefield. c.) Terror attack on a city to break Ukrainian resolve to resist.
Sagan pointed out that in 2016, there was a senior level exercise in the US among key members of the Obama Administration that dealt with a Russian nuclear attack on a NATO airbase in the Baltics. The first group of leaders who went through the wargame elected to strike the base from which the nuclear attack originated, destroying it with conventional forces. The second team that went through the next day ended up employing NATO nuclear weapons on three targets in Belarus, even though Belarus was not involved in the war, nor did any of the Russian attacks on the Baltics originate from Belarussian territory.
Exactly how we would respond is pretty much deliberately vague, but the most likely avenue would be significant conventional response.
However, Sagan suggested that the behind the scenes discussions going on by the US and Russian defense leadership & military should be used to quietly and consistently remind the Russians that a nuclear attack on a civilian population would be a massive violation of international law, and the US would declare anyone involved in the chain of command that issued, passed along or executed that order would end up in the dock at the Hague to be tried as a war criminal. The intent here would be to add a sliver of personal deterrence into the Russian military leadership.
Rose had some very interesting points to make. She was a member of the negotiating team that worked on the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START). The Russians have scrupulously abided by the treaty's requirements, including reporting all routine movement of strategic nuclear weapons as they rotate in and out of maintenance facilities, or are relocated to different areas. In one case, just after the war started, they sent 18 notifications to the US in one day detailing movements. They'd never sent that many before, and most saw it as behind-the-scenes message to counter-balance the rhetoric on Russian state TV and from various political leaders in Russia.
Additionally, both the US and the Russians are required to submit data bases detailing all nuclear warheads twice a year. The Russians have already submitted the first one.
That said, NATO activated its CBRN defense measures and elements for its forward deployed forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. CBRN= Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear. This was done to protect the troops as well as to send a message to the Russians that the West is ready and if they choose to act, it will not be without consequences.
She also pointed out that in recent weeks, Putin toned down some of his rhetoric, especially the May 9th victory speech.
As a side note, Rose pointed out that NATO was preparing to pivot to Asia to help contain growing Chinese expansionism. The Russian attack on Ukraine has refocused NATO and made Europe its center of gravity again.
6. What if Putin becomes unhinged and orders an attack?
Well, it turns out the Russian defense establishment was concerned at that happening under Yeltsin due to his alcoholism. They placed into the system of series of checks and balances to ensure that a drunk or insane leader could not unilaterally get the missiles launched.
The Russians have a system that is similar to ours. They have their own nuclear football, three of them actually. Putin's aids keep one with him at all times, the chief of staff has the second, and the Defense Minister has the third. They cannot launch a nuclear attack without at least 2 of the 3, and possibly all 3 working together to approve and validate it.
Overall feeling among the group was the threat of nuclear use is very low. Nuclear terrorism is seen as about a 1% chance event. Rose said today that she thinks the chances in Ukraine are higher, but not by much. Certainly less than 10%.
In the absence of John R Bruning, here's the latest assessment by John's friend, John Parshall.
I want to talk today about what’s going on at Severodonetsk, and how it feels to me relative to the big picture. Warning: Long post (1,400 words) Typical Disclaimer: WWII historian, mostly coming at this from a historical perspective, using analogs to that conflict, along with whatever else I know about modern Russian and Ukrainian weaponry, tactics, etc. Heavily informed by opinions of folks like Tom Cooper, Stefan Korshak, Perun, War on the Rocks, Institute for the Study of War, etc. TL;DR: 1) the importance of Severodonetsk is being blown **way** out of proportion, 2) I think Russia has basically shot its wad, and 3) Ukraine’s got this, if it can just hang on.
A lot of people in the U.S., and certainly in the media, have really wringing their hands over what’s going on around Severodonetsk. Breathless phrases like “inflection point” and the Ukrainians being faced with “stark choices,” and blah blah blah are being bandied about, as if this fight is going to be crucial to the outcome of the war. I just don’t see it that way. Win or lose at Severodonetsk, Russia is running out of steam. And even if they win at Severodonetsk and occupy the city, I just don’t think the Russian Army has the oomph to follow it up in any sort of meaningful way.
To me, this ongoing frontal head-banging simply illustrates the continuing degradation of Russian combat power, which in turn is driving a constant diminution of Russian operational objectives. Plan A was thunder runs into Ukraine from four different directions, aimed at capturing the whole country outright. That failed catastrophically. Plan B was taking Kharkiv. Nyet. Plan C was a large envelopment of the majority of Eastern Ukraine. Nyet. Plan D was a smaller encirclement by trying to drive down from Izyum and up from Donetsk. Nyet. Plan E was a still smaller encirclement down from Lyman and up from Horlivka. Nyet. Plan F was supposed to be driving down across the Siverski Donets river from the north, and up from Popasna in the south, but the northern pincer’s bridgeheads have been beaten back umpty times. And now Plan G is continuing to widen the Poposna breach (which has been gradually working, mind you), accompanied by a frontal assault into Severodonetsk (which is also gradually “working”)(whatever “working” means).
There’s no question that Russian forces have also made grudging gains around Izyum, Lyman, and Horlivka. President Zelenksy is absolutely right in agonizing over the fact that 20% of Ukraine is now under the Russian boot. Furthermore, (as I predicted) fighting in the east has meant that Russian airpower is at least marginally more effective, and the logistical problems for the Ukrainians have increased. This area is largely beyond the coverage of NATO intel assets (like the P-8 Poseidon naval surveillance plane that played a role in helping the Ukrainians scupper Moskva), meaning that UKR probably isn’t receiving the benefit of as much real-time intel from the West. And Tom Cooper is reporting that the electronic warfare environment is becoming more difficult there as well, meaning that UKR is having more problems operating drones, which is of course super important not only for delivering direct fire from Bayraktars, but also as coordinating counter-battery fire for their arty. So, there’s no question that the Ukrainian struggle in the east is incredibly difficult at the moment, and that the Ukrainian Army is under tremendous strain. But they aren’t showing signs of buckling.
Oh the flip, the Russians are employing large numbers of Chechens and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) troops at Severodonetsk. Why? Because 1) Chechen and LPR body bags don’t bother folks back home in Russia, and 2) because the Russian Army remains very, very short of infantry. We have confirmed sightings of older hardware like T-62 main battle tanks (a design which dates from the late 1950s) being fed to LPR units. And while the Ukrainians may have retreated from the bulk of Severodonetsk a few days ago, they also retained the ability to counterattack and reclaim a substantial portion of the town, giving the Chechens a **** nose in the process.
Meanwhile, another Russian general was killed in combat a couple days ago. Five other generals of various flavors were apparently fired last week. There have been reports from UKR intel that Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Army’s Chief of Staff, has been “suspended.” He certainly didn’t attend the Victory Day parade a month ago, and he **** well ought to have been there. Likewise, there have been unconfirmed reports that Gen. Dvornikov, the new supreme commander for the Ukrainian “Special Military Operation” has either been given until 10 June to completely capture Severodonetsk, or has indeed already been sacked and replaced by Gen. Gennady Zhidko. Either way, he hasn’t been seen publicly in two weeks. Put all those hints together, and the picture that emerges is not one that either smells like happiness in the Kremlin, or impending Russian victory.
Now zoom up to the big picture. Severodonetsk is the 42nd largest city in Ukraine. Basically, the entire remaining ground power of the once-feared Russian Army is focused on a life-or-death struggle to capture a town the size of Dearborn, MI, or Green Bay, WI. Now, obviously, inflection points can happen at unimportant locales (Guadalcanal comes to mind). But this doesn’t smell that way to me, because 1) UKR isn’t going to let its forces be surrounded and wiped out, and 2) the RFA doesn’t seem to have the oomph necessary to exploit a victory. Even if they capture Severodonetsk, where do they go from there? The closest major city is Kramatorsk, but that’s 45 miles further west. They ain’t gettin’ there, not at this rate. To me it smells very much like the Russian offensive is culminating.
I also smell real parallels with German Sixth Army’s plight in Stalingrad. In September ’42, the German objective was capturing Stalingrad outright; by October, the Germans were forced to give that up, and instead shifted focus to capturing the northern factory district; by November, they were focused on capturing individual factories, and finally on the goal of capturing *individual buildings* within those factories! At which point, you have to ask yourself what possible effect capturing Hall 4 in the Krasnyi Oktyabr factory would have had on the larger strategic outlook for Germany’s war? Answer: none. But that’s what Hitler was fixated on, because it was the only objective left amidst the ruins of his broader summer ’42 campaign that still offered something that felt like a tangible victory. In my opinion, Putin is doing the same thing: over-focusing on a smallish city in the middle of the Donbas rustbelt, and then hoping that by having seized Luhansk oblast he can declare some kind of victory. But the whole premise is asinine in terms of blood and treasure expended.
(Note that it is possible that if Russia manages to have (temporary) possession of Luhansk, they may try to formally annex it and Donetsk oblasts into Russia, which would have the effect of ostensibly placing those territories under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. However, my sense is that that gambit would not be effective, and that we are already telling the Russians behind the scenes that not only won’t we recognize the legality of that move, nobody else will, either, and if you think you can get away with then using nukes to defend Luhansk, be aware that we will treat that as using nukes against Ukraine instead… and that you don’t wanna do that for a whole host of unpleasant reasons. At least, that’s my guess about the nature of the back-channel conversations.)
Meanwhile, slooooooowly, the productive spigots are turning on in the NATO alliance. It’s taking 2-3 months from when promises of Western equipment are being made, to when they’re actually being delivered. So, Stefan Korshak reports that with respect to the German Panzerhaubitz systems that Ukraine will be receiving, their Ukrainian crews have now gotten done with their classroom training, and are ready to start field training. We know that a fair number of M777 howitzers are now in country, and more are coming, but some have already been lost, and more ammunition is needed. Welcome to war. But while this pipeline feels agonizingly slow to get revved up, note that Russia’s main tank factory at Nizhni-Tagil isn’t producing anything because it can’t get parts. The Russians are running out of precision munitions. Message: Ukraine’s munitions pipeline is eventually going to be markedly superior to Russia’s. We ain’t there yet, not by a long shot. But if Ukraine can hang on, I’m pretty confident the balance of firepower is going to change.
So what's your thinking Vesp , that not one Russian soldier has raped, yeah, perhaps mass rapes are exaggerated but you're not telling me it doesn't happen
So what's your thinking Vesp , that not one Russian soldier has raped, yeah, perhaps mass rapes are exaggerated but you're not telling me it doesn't happen
Not at all Crimes committed by both sides, as with every war. The issue is we only hear one side of the story, as do the Russians.
Liz Truss branded a liar after backtracking on Ukraine war claim
The foreign secretary has been branded a liar after backtracking on comments she made claiming the UK government would "support" Brits wanting to fight in Ukraine.
Liz Truss's apparent backing of those wanting to travel to Ukraine shortly after Putin launched his invasion has come under fresh scrutiny following the capture of two British men, Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner, who have subsequently been sentenced to death.
While neither Mr Aslin nor Mr Pinner travelled to Ukraine to fight – as they were already living there prior to the invasion – their planned execution is a clear indication of how Moscow plans to deal with prisoners.
In February, asked if she would back Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky's call for foreigners to join Ukraine in defending the country, Truss told BBC’s Sunday Morning programme: "I do support that. Of course, that is something people can make their own decisions about.
"The people of Ukraine are fighting for freedom and democracy, not just for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe, because that is what president Putin is challenging."
At the time the official advice from the Foreign Office warned against all travel to Ukraine as Putin's forces tried – and failed – to mount a full-scale invasion.
But on Tuesday, Truss was asked as to whether such comments about British fighters were a mistake.
But she denied sending mixed messages, telling BBC Radio 4: “We’ve always been clear that our travel advice is not to go to Ukraine and I was clear about that at the time.”
When pressed on whether she encouraged Brits to head to Ukraine, she insisted: “What I said though, is I also said the travel advice is not to go to Ukraine.”
Comments
Are we not winning anymore?
Does this mean that France are entitled to invade us?
PS-it is not "Kiev's force".
It is the Ukrainian Army. In Ukraine.
There were numerous Russians there each and everyone of the were rude, barged passed anyone waiting for food they would pick the whole plate up of what ever was there they didn't give a monkeys about anyone
The worst thing for me was , there was a football team there all black kids with a black coach from London having a whale of a time in the pool when 5 or 6 Russians stood in a line right next to them doing the naz i salute all with intimidating looks , these were big lads who wanted a confrontation with kids the coach was mortified and i had to calm him down teloing him they were not worth spoiling their holiday over
Thats Russians for you , backwards
Strategic/West-Russia Update:
Today, I sat in on a Zoom seminar given by four Stanford nuclear weapons policy scholars. They were pulled together to discuss a central question of the Ukraine crisis: Will Putin use nuclear weapons?
Some takeaways from the discussion:
1. Despite Putin's nuclear saber rattling, there's been no change in posture of the Russian strategic forces. No nuclear weapons have been removed from storage (this is where their tactical weapons are located), and the "special alert" Putin mentioned on Feb. 27th simply added a few extra personnel to the command and control system for their strategic forces. So, the posturing, public comments and CGI videos of the UK & the US getting nuked are not being matched by concrete, threatening moves with the actual missiles. All talk. So far.
2. Scott Sagan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Sagan) pointed out that he believes the likelihood of Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has diminished send the end of February and early March. The disaster in front of Kyiv forced Putin to scale back the war's aims and that, Sagan believes led to a lowering of the chance for nuclear use. IE: nobody is going to use nuclear weapons in a limited war, especially in territory they want to annex.
3. That said, everyone on the panel agreed the West and the U.S. in particular needs to think through what our response would be to a Russian nuclear attack in Eastern Europe. It turns out there is. The Pentagon has created a "Tiger Team" to game board scenarios and come up with responses.
4. Potential NATA/US Responses: It really depends on how the nuclear weapon was employed. Options include: a.) A demonstration use, including in the Black Sea. This is seen as the most unlikely scenario. b.) Military target, such as an airfield or on the battlefield. c.) Terror attack on a city to break Ukrainian resolve to resist.
Sagan pointed out that in 2016, there was a senior level exercise in the US among key members of the Obama Administration that dealt with a Russian nuclear attack on a NATO airbase in the Baltics. The first group of leaders who went through the wargame elected to strike the base from which the nuclear attack originated, destroying it with conventional forces. The second team that went through the next day ended up employing NATO nuclear weapons on three targets in Belarus, even though Belarus was not involved in the war, nor did any of the Russian attacks on the Baltics originate from Belarussian territory.
Exactly how we would respond is pretty much deliberately vague, but the most likely avenue would be significant conventional response.
However, Sagan suggested that the behind the scenes discussions going on by the US and Russian defense leadership & military should be used to quietly and consistently remind the Russians that a nuclear attack on a civilian population would be a massive violation of international law, and the US would declare anyone involved in the chain of command that issued, passed along or executed that order would end up in the dock at the Hague to be tried as a war criminal. The intent here would be to add a sliver of personal deterrence into the Russian military leadership.
5.Rose Gottemoeller Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_Gottemoeller
Rose had some very interesting points to make. She was a member of the negotiating team that worked on the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START). The Russians have scrupulously abided by the treaty's requirements, including reporting all routine movement of strategic nuclear weapons as they rotate in and out of maintenance facilities, or are relocated to different areas. In one case, just after the war started, they sent 18 notifications to the US in one day detailing movements. They'd never sent that many before, and most saw it as behind-the-scenes message to counter-balance the rhetoric on Russian state TV and from various political leaders in Russia.
Additionally, both the US and the Russians are required to submit data bases detailing all nuclear warheads twice a year. The Russians have already submitted the first one.
That said, NATO activated its CBRN defense measures and elements for its forward deployed forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. CBRN= Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear. This was done to protect the troops as well as to send a message to the Russians that the West is ready and if they choose to act, it will not be without consequences.
She also pointed out that in recent weeks, Putin toned down some of his rhetoric, especially the May 9th victory speech.
As a side note, Rose pointed out that NATO was preparing to pivot to Asia to help contain growing Chinese expansionism. The Russian attack on Ukraine has refocused NATO and made Europe its center of gravity again.
6. What if Putin becomes unhinged and orders an attack?
Well, it turns out the Russian defense establishment was concerned at that happening under Yeltsin due to his alcoholism. They placed into the system of series of checks and balances to ensure that a drunk or insane leader could not unilaterally get the missiles launched.
The Russians have a system that is similar to ours. They have their own nuclear football, three of them actually. Putin's aids keep one with him at all times, the chief of staff has the second, and the Defense Minister has the third. They cannot launch a nuclear attack without at least 2 of the 3, and possibly all 3 working together to approve and validate it.
Overall feeling among the group was the threat of nuclear use is very low. Nuclear terrorism is seen as about a 1% chance event. Rose said today that she thinks the chances in Ukraine are higher, but not by much. Certainly less than 10%.
In the absence of John R Bruning, here's the latest assessment by John's friend, John Parshall.
I want to talk today about what’s going on at Severodonetsk, and how it feels to me relative to the big picture. Warning: Long post (1,400 words) Typical Disclaimer: WWII historian, mostly coming at this from a historical perspective, using analogs to that conflict, along with whatever else I know about modern Russian and Ukrainian weaponry, tactics, etc. Heavily informed by opinions of folks like Tom Cooper, Stefan Korshak, Perun, War on the Rocks, Institute for the Study of War, etc. TL;DR: 1) the importance of Severodonetsk is being blown **way** out of proportion, 2) I think Russia has basically shot its wad, and 3) Ukraine’s got this, if it can just hang on.
A lot of people in the U.S., and certainly in the media, have really wringing their hands over what’s going on around Severodonetsk. Breathless phrases like “inflection point” and the Ukrainians being faced with “stark choices,” and blah blah blah are being bandied about, as if this fight is going to be crucial to the outcome of the war. I just don’t see it that way. Win or lose at Severodonetsk, Russia is running out of steam. And even if they win at Severodonetsk and occupy the city, I just don’t think the Russian Army has the oomph to follow it up in any sort of meaningful way.
To me, this ongoing frontal head-banging simply illustrates the continuing degradation of Russian combat power, which in turn is driving a constant diminution of Russian operational objectives. Plan A was thunder runs into Ukraine from four different directions, aimed at capturing the whole country outright. That failed catastrophically. Plan B was taking Kharkiv. Nyet. Plan C was a large envelopment of the majority of Eastern Ukraine. Nyet. Plan D was a smaller encirclement by trying to drive down from Izyum and up from Donetsk. Nyet. Plan E was a still smaller encirclement down from Lyman and up from Horlivka. Nyet. Plan F was supposed to be driving down across the Siverski Donets river from the north, and up from Popasna in the south, but the northern pincer’s bridgeheads have been beaten back umpty times. And now Plan G is continuing to widen the Poposna breach (which has been gradually working, mind you), accompanied by a frontal assault into Severodonetsk (which is also gradually “working”)(whatever “working” means).
There’s no question that Russian forces have also made grudging gains around Izyum, Lyman, and Horlivka. President Zelenksy is absolutely right in agonizing over the fact that 20% of Ukraine is now under the Russian boot. Furthermore, (as I predicted) fighting in the east has meant that Russian airpower is at least marginally more effective, and the logistical problems for the Ukrainians have increased. This area is largely beyond the coverage of NATO intel assets (like the P-8 Poseidon naval surveillance plane that played a role in helping the Ukrainians scupper Moskva), meaning that UKR probably isn’t receiving the benefit of as much real-time intel from the West. And Tom Cooper is reporting that the electronic warfare environment is becoming more difficult there as well, meaning that UKR is having more problems operating drones, which is of course super important not only for delivering direct fire from Bayraktars, but also as coordinating counter-battery fire for their arty. So, there’s no question that the Ukrainian struggle in the east is incredibly difficult at the moment, and that the Ukrainian Army is under tremendous strain. But they aren’t showing signs of buckling.
Oh the flip, the Russians are employing large numbers of Chechens and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) troops at Severodonetsk. Why? Because 1) Chechen and LPR body bags don’t bother folks back home in Russia, and 2) because the Russian Army remains very, very short of infantry. We have confirmed sightings of older hardware like T-62 main battle tanks (a design which dates from the late 1950s) being fed to LPR units. And while the Ukrainians may have retreated from the bulk of Severodonetsk a few days ago, they also retained the ability to counterattack and reclaim a substantial portion of the town, giving the Chechens a **** nose in the process.
Meanwhile, another Russian general was killed in combat a couple days ago. Five other generals of various flavors were apparently fired last week. There have been reports from UKR intel that Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Army’s Chief of Staff, has been “suspended.” He certainly didn’t attend the Victory Day parade a month ago, and he **** well ought to have been there. Likewise, there have been unconfirmed reports that Gen. Dvornikov, the new supreme commander for the Ukrainian “Special Military Operation” has either been given until 10 June to completely capture Severodonetsk, or has indeed already been sacked and replaced by Gen. Gennady Zhidko. Either way, he hasn’t been seen publicly in two weeks. Put all those hints together, and the picture that emerges is not one that either smells like happiness in the Kremlin, or impending Russian victory.
Now zoom up to the big picture. Severodonetsk is the 42nd largest city in Ukraine. Basically, the entire remaining ground power of the once-feared Russian Army is focused on a life-or-death struggle to capture a town the size of Dearborn, MI, or Green Bay, WI. Now, obviously, inflection points can happen at unimportant locales (Guadalcanal comes to mind). But this doesn’t smell that way to me, because 1) UKR isn’t going to let its forces be surrounded and wiped out, and 2) the RFA doesn’t seem to have the oomph necessary to exploit a victory. Even if they capture Severodonetsk, where do they go from there? The closest major city is Kramatorsk, but that’s 45 miles further west. They ain’t gettin’ there, not at this rate. To me it smells very much like the Russian offensive is culminating.
I also smell real parallels with German Sixth Army’s plight in Stalingrad. In September ’42, the German objective was capturing Stalingrad outright; by October, the Germans were forced to give that up, and instead shifted focus to capturing the northern factory district; by November, they were focused on capturing individual factories, and finally on the goal of capturing *individual buildings* within those factories! At which point, you have to ask yourself what possible effect capturing Hall 4 in the Krasnyi Oktyabr factory would have had on the larger strategic outlook for Germany’s war? Answer: none. But that’s what Hitler was fixated on, because it was the only objective left amidst the ruins of his broader summer ’42 campaign that still offered something that felt like a tangible victory. In my opinion, Putin is doing the same thing: over-focusing on a smallish city in the middle of the Donbas rustbelt, and then hoping that by having seized Luhansk oblast he can declare some kind of victory. But the whole premise is asinine in terms of blood and treasure expended.
(Note that it is possible that if Russia manages to have (temporary) possession of Luhansk, they may try to formally annex it and Donetsk oblasts into Russia, which would have the effect of ostensibly placing those territories under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. However, my sense is that that gambit would not be effective, and that we are already telling the Russians behind the scenes that not only won’t we recognize the legality of that move, nobody else will, either, and if you think you can get away with then using nukes to defend Luhansk, be aware that we will treat that as using nukes against Ukraine instead… and that you don’t wanna do that for a whole host of unpleasant reasons. At least, that’s my guess about the nature of the back-channel conversations.)
Meanwhile, slooooooowly, the productive spigots are turning on in the NATO alliance. It’s taking 2-3 months from when promises of Western equipment are being made, to when they’re actually being delivered. So, Stefan Korshak reports that with respect to the German Panzerhaubitz systems that Ukraine will be receiving, their Ukrainian crews have now gotten done with their classroom training, and are ready to start field training. We know that a fair number of M777 howitzers are now in country, and more are coming, but some have already been lost, and more ammunition is needed. Welcome to war. But while this pipeline feels agonizingly slow to get revved up, note that Russia’s main tank factory at Nizhni-Tagil isn’t producing anything because it can’t get parts. The Russians are running out of precision munitions. Message: Ukraine’s munitions pipeline is eventually going to be markedly superior to Russia’s. We ain’t there yet, not by a long shot. But if Ukraine can hang on, I’m pretty confident the balance of firepower is going to change.
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ousted-ukrainian-official-breaks-silence-admits-she-lied-about-mass-rape-russians
Crimes committed by both sides, as with every war.
The issue is we only hear one side of the story, as do the Russians.
https://uk.yahoo.com/news/britons-sentenced-death-show-trial-140122302.html
The foreign secretary has been branded a liar after backtracking on comments she made claiming the UK government would "support" Brits wanting to fight in Ukraine.
Liz Truss's apparent backing of those wanting to travel to Ukraine shortly after Putin launched his invasion has come under fresh scrutiny following the capture of two British men, Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner, who have subsequently been sentenced to death.
While neither Mr Aslin nor Mr Pinner travelled to Ukraine to fight – as they were already living there prior to the invasion – their planned execution is a clear indication of how Moscow plans to deal with prisoners.
In February, asked if she would back Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky's call for foreigners to join Ukraine in defending the country, Truss told BBC’s Sunday Morning programme: "I do support that. Of course, that is something people can make their own decisions about.
"The people of Ukraine are fighting for freedom and democracy, not just for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe, because that is what president Putin is challenging."
At the time the official advice from the Foreign Office warned against all travel to Ukraine as Putin's forces tried – and failed – to mount a full-scale invasion.
But on Tuesday, Truss was asked as to whether such comments about British fighters were a mistake.
But she denied sending mixed messages, telling BBC Radio 4: “We’ve always been clear that our travel advice is not to go to Ukraine and I was clear about that at the time.”
When pressed on whether she encouraged Brits to head to Ukraine, she insisted: “What I said though, is I also said the travel advice is not to go to Ukraine.”
https://uk.yahoo.com/news/liz-truss-branded-liar-after-backtracking-ukraine-war-claim-105914188.html